View source for Pandemic/2-11CCGuidelines

{{DISPLAYTITLE: 2-11 Identify and document a summary of the leading practices, procedures, mitigations for pandemic response}}

'''<big>This page was last updated October 26 2021. Contact akelly@epri.com for more details</big>'''

'''Notes'''

''1. To ensure consistency and standardization in terminology (and using ESCC definitions) in the below information the term '''"Critical Operations Employees"''' refers to: 
* '''Control Center Operators''' - shift crew, including supervisors and managers. For transmission, this role must be performed in a control center within a secure Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) perimeter. Depending on the operational function, the role of the control center operator and the dispatcher can be combined. 
* '''Dispatcher personnel''' - who interact with employees in the field. In some situations in distribution, this role can be carried out remotely or carried out in field offices.  
* '''Direct support personnel''' - who assist in performing operational activities such as outage planning and switch order writing. 
* '''Indirect support personnel''' - who assist with the maintenance and security of IT and OT tools in the control center.
All except control center operators can work remotely in some form, but it's highly likely all will need access to the control center facility in some form, even during a pandemic, when travel may be restricted. 

2. The term '''" company/organization"''' is used as a catch-all to represent, companies, utilities, government-owned organizations, investor-owned entities.  
 
3. The ESCC terminology guidelines related to isolation, quarantine, and sequestration are used on this page and refer to the following:
* '''Shelter-in-place:''' Employees remain in their private residence with their families, leaving the house only for essential needs such as food, medical care, and work. 
* '''Self-quarantine:''' Following the onset of pandemic-related symptoms or a positive test, employees should remain in their primary home isolated from everybody (including family) and should not leave for any reason. 
* '''Sequestration:''' Employees with no symptoms and no risks are isolated for an extended period in the company/organization's facilities (e.g. control center) to perform their functions and tasks in isolation from external risks and with no interpersonal contact with individuals outside of the sequestration space. 
'' 

==Pre Planning and Preparation==
===Risk Assessment===
It is recommended to have an approach to assessing the pandemic risk to control center and real-time operations in real-time with the best available data. There is no one standard approach to risk assessment criteria or methodology that fits all scenarios, regions, countries, or company-specific considerations. Some factors to be considered when assessing risk to control center operations personnel include:
* Monitoring community infection rates (state, region, city, or more granular).
* Monitoring of health care facility status in region or country, including access to vaccines. 
* Availability of suitable PPE to mitigate the pandemic.
* Critical operations employee infection rates and the health and well-being of critical operations employees and/or critical operations employees immediate family members, if it's possible to track
* Country government or state/region guidelines, or public health administrators declarations. 
* Industry trends, similar companies/organization postures. Preferably engaged through a forum where many similar organizations and companies are engaged. In the USA NERC, EPRI, ESCC, NATF, Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center (E-ISAC). In Europe ENTSO-E. In UK Energy Network Asociation. 

A combination of these metrics can be monitored in real-time or with adequate reporting through dashboards. 

''[Ref: ESCC and EPRI]''

===Business Continuity and Engagement with Internal Operations Teams===
It is prudent to develop, and continually update, the business continuity plan, where there is an increased risk of a pandemic (or other non-pandemic risks). This should involve internal teams of stakeholders, including key decision-makers, health and safety, human resources, IT, and other identified key employees in the company/organization. 
* The cross-functional business continuity team handles pandemic and business continuity responses for the company/organization. 
* The key representative(s) will engage with local/state/national authorities to liaise at this level and ensure barriers to continued, effective operation are mitigated and the most up-to-date risk assessment and mitigation factors and information are available. 
* The team should also identify, if not already apparent, the critical functions and processes, business services, and activities related to the continued operation of the electricity system by the company/organization. 
* The team should also identify, if not already apparent, the critical employees and facilities required to fulfill the critical functions and processes for the continued operation of the electricity system. 
* The team should develop a messaging strategy for employees and external stakeholders around who, what, and when information is provided in relation to critical operations functions when there is a heightened risk.  
''[Ref: ESCC and EPRI]''  

===Engagement with External Operations Team and Authorities===
As control centers are considered critical to the functioning of society, especially during a pandemic, the company/organization should engage with lawmakers and authorities at the local/state/national level and other key stakeholders to ensure access to facilities is unimpeded, and operations can continue, as seamlessly as possible. These communications links (if established early) help remove barriers to operations in critical scenarios, which otherwise might remain. Advanced preparation and planning for pandemic risks can be made in this regard, including:
* Identify points of contact within the company and with authorities that may be on rapid response or task force teams in emergency scenarios. These authorities can include: 
** State and/or local government or appointed officials
** Federal or national government agencies, departments, or civil servants
** Local union or labor officials
** State and/or national health authorities, especially public health authorities.  
Once the appropriate stakeholders for rapid response are identified, meeting logistics can be prepared and tested, including:
* Establish a forum for meeting, (in person, virtual) such as the location, log-in details, etc. 
 * Establish a method for sharing information (email, cloud-based document sharing services)
* Develop governance of the group, such as hierarchy or the chain of command. 
* Test meetings with the response teams to road test the group structure and to address issues during normal times (i.e. ot during the actual pandemic). 
For an actual pandemic response, the team should work to: 
* Establish the most appropriate tracking metrics to assess the pandemic and public-health risks, so that the team is making decisions based on the same, consistent information, and to ensure it is transparent, traceable, and reliable during a pandemic.
* Engage with the external operations teams to establish an expedited pandemic testing regime and the provision of medical services for critical operations employees, who should be treated comparably to front-line workers or first responders. 
* Develop an agreed authorization method (for example an authorization letter), to allow critical operations employees to travel and to enter critical sites such as control centers if there are restrictions on movement due to pandemic spread. Authorization letters could be accompanied by an appropriate employee ID or company logo on the company vehicle.
* Engage with appropriate electricity regulators at the local, state, or national level to invoke temporary relaxation of certain reliability requirements, such as training certification, some maintenance activities, audit response. 
''[Ref: EPRI and ESCC]''

===Material Supply Logistics Planning===
As part of business continuity plans, companies should engage in the preparation and the securing of supplies on an ongoing basis and at the earliest possible moment of increased pandemic risk. Steps can include:
* Securing supply lines with contractors or local/state/national government for critical:
** System operations equipment 
** Hygiene equipment
** PPE
* Securing internal or contractor supply of food and food preparation materials. 
* Developing secure storage for materials with long shelf lives for pandemic mitigation (such as PPE) and ensure regular stock takes and updates. 
''[Ref: EPRI and ESCC]''

===Critical Operations Employee Capacity Building===
As part of pre-pandemic planning and control center mitigation strategies, a plan to extend the capacity of critical operations employees should be developed. For obvious reasons, it is critical these exercises are carried out before the pandemic occurs, rather than during it. These planning exercises should include:
* An assessment of current shift-crew resources and experience.
* An assessment of "bench-strength" control center operations resources in the company that can include: 
** Personnel who has previously worked as a critical operations employee.
** Recently retired personnel (although pandemic risk factors may be an issue).
** Personnel currently in training to become critical operations employees. 
** Operator training employees. 
** Control center managers, supervisors.
** Field operators, with experience of operation, if possible. 
* Assessment of the workload of an operator, during high pandemic activity and outside of it. In some cases, capital project and maintenance outage work may be reduced, so control center operator workload may reduce, which may impact required staffing levels. 
* Establishment of the minimum viable levels for critical operations employees to continue the most basic functions of real-time operations 
* An assessment of the rapid, basic training requirements required to refresh or upgrade training for emergency operators, if required. 
* Establishment of the process to quickly transfer employees, with experience in operations from non-critical functions to critical functions or operations, as appropriate. 
* Development of a flexible critical operations employees contingency plan, with order on who will be first to last on replenishing diminished shift crews. 
''[Ref: ESCC, EPRI Interviews]''

===Information Communication Technology===
During a pandemic, there is likely to be increased ICT traffic and requirements for equipment. The following considerations should be made in advance, as part of the pre-planning phase for the pandemic:
* It is recommended to perform stress tests on IT networks and capabilities in advance of a full pandemic, if possible, so that preparations are made for potentially overloaded systems if/when a pandemic strikes. 
* Remote work facilities and equipment should be ergonomically optimized (or information easily accessible for how employees can ergonomically optimize equipment) for staff to perform tasks remotely. This can include including headsets, desk space, laptops, meetings, and computer equipment usage (keyboard, mouse, etc). 
* Warnings and information related to increased cyber security risks should be provided to all employees during periods of remote operations work, given the likely extra vulnerabilities. 
''[Ref: ESCC]''

===Early Preparation and Intervention===
It is prudent to consider ongoing monitoring of pandemic and public health risk factors and metrics (see Engagement with Authorities section above). If the risk is seen to be increasing even slightly, the following preparations can be made with minimal disruption to ensure business continuity:
* Recommendations to all staff (not just critical operations employees) and visitors to increase hygiene measures and increase awareness campaigns and announcements, from the managerial level down, about the risks. 
* Assessing and possibly reducing visitor access to critical facilities to a needs-only attendance in person.
* Increase remote or virtual work for non-critical operations employees.
* Limit large group meetings of staff indoors, especially critical operations employees. Use remote or virtual work facilities such as webcasts and instant messaging for communication. 
* Restricting business travel for critical operations employees   
* Restricting foreign travel of critical operations employees, especially to countries with high-risk factors, if possible. This should also include recommendations for safety precautions if travel is necessary and for when the employee returns.
* Initial engagement with authorities response team (see section above).
* Checks on facility cleanliness, contamination risks, and critical supply stock-piles. 
* Initial engagement with material logistics suppliers and contractors, to ensure supply line security for PPE, cleaning equipment, food etc. 
''[Ref: EPRI and ESCC]''

===Critical Operations Employees Health and Safety Pre-Pandemic Planning===
Procedures should be put in place, in the pre-pandemic planning stage on critical operations employees' health and well-being checks and monitoring. Establishing these procedures as early as possible will be very valuable if/when a pandemic develops. Some examples of these procedures can include: 
* Development of an employee and visitor health and well-being check-in system. Preferably this system should be an online system or platform, accessible and secure for employees and visitors to enter information. 
** The health and well-being monitor can track survey responses to symptom-related questions as well as more granular health indicators such as temperature.  
** The system can be linked to security access. For example, only if the requisite questions are answered and information provided, should access be granted.
** The system can also be used to track cases, absences, and other indicators to inform decision-making by the internal operations team. 
* Critical operations employees should self-administer wellness checks at home, prior to departure to the facility for work, potentially using the online health and well-being portal). Health checks should align with the latest company/organization guidelines and/or local/state/national government health guidelines. 
* Testing for asymptomatic and symptomatic infection should be increased to the extent this is possible. This can be carried out by the company/organization's medical staff or contracted medical staff on-site, at regular intervals. 
* Clear guidance on reporting of symptoms and wellness, such as temperature thresholds, time periods, fever, cough, etc. (These symptoms will change depending on the nature of the pathogen and will be updated by public health officials and so are not provided here).
* Engage with relevant health as part of the external operations teams, to institute appropriate testing regimes for critical operations employees if the pandemic risk increases.
* Engage with relevant health institutions as part of the external operations team, to develop structures for medical care and treatments for critical operations employees if the pandemic risk increases, community spread increases, or hospitals become overloaded.
* Determine family supports for employees, if they have to care for an ill family member or if they have to be cared for by their family. 
* If possible, provide an employee-only, confidential medical hotline, with priority for critical operations employees to contact the company/organization's medical provider and practitioners to discuss and seek medical advice or treatments. 
* If possible - given the restrictions on confidential data - establish a temporary online geographic map with locations of the key operations employees. This is to cross-reference against what may be restricted regions, during a pandemic and to assess the risk to employees due to community spread. 
** For critical operations employees living in a restricted area due to community spread, consideration should be given to the provision of alternative accommodation, or sequestration (see the section on sequestration below)
''[Ref: EPRI and ESCC]''

==Control Centre Pandemic Mitigation Strategies==
In the situation that some employees (either normal or critical operations employees) have contracted a pandemic-related illness or some of the general public risk factors or metrics, as assessed with the internal or external teams have increased to the point where increased mitigations need to be initiated - the following topics, recommendations or guidelines should be considered. 

===Incident Command Structure=== 
Depending on the severity of the pandemic risk, it is prudent to establish an incident command structure and the team at an early stage in the process and decision-making for real-time operations on a daily basis. Communications between the ICS team and critical operations employees should be channeled through this team. 
* The incident command team should link with the internal operations team (business continuity) and external operations team (liaising with external government and public health authorities) as required for external communication and to enhance decision making.

=== Critical Operations Employees Health and Safety Mitigation ===
With particular note for critical operations employees, but also relevant to normal employees: 
* Clear guidance on reporting of symptoms and wellness, such as temperature thresholds, time periods, fever, cough, etc. (These symptoms will change depending on the nature of the pathogen and will be updated by appropriate public health officials and so are not provided here) 
'''** For more details, please refer to EPRI Pandemic Resilient System Supplemental Project WS1.''' 
* Engage with medical service providers and practitioners for the best available medical advice.
''[Ref: EPRI, ESCC]''

===Physical Distancing===
* Regardless of all other mitigation strategies, if there is an active pandemic, physical distancing should be encouraged and enforced, both on shift and between operators when they are off-shift. At least 6 feet (2 meters) of distancing was recommended as a good rule of thumb. 
''[Ref: ESCC, EPRI Interviews]''

=== PPE (Personal Protective Equipment) === 
* When within 6 feet of another person, masks should be worn. Masks are generally not required when sitting alone at the desk as clear phone communications and commands are required. 
* Mask or faceguard mandates for indoor work according to the government or public health guidelines
* If the pandemic pathogens are proven to be spread via touch, gloves may be required and may be advisable as a precaution in the absence of strong evidence. 
* Plastic or perspex "sneeze guard" between operators can be installed if possible. While these give protection for close-quarter working, they take up space on the desk and may impact efficient operations. 
''[Ref: EPRI, ESCC]''

===Access to Facilities===
* Only critical operations employees (as defined above) such as operators, managers, and supervisors, some operations planning support, some limited IT support, and some facilities support) should have access to the control center building during the pandemic or any society lockdown phase. 
* Access can be controlled by security and can be governed by a health status reporting system - where people who request access to the facility complete a health status survey questionnaire, the results of which are released to facility security to permit or deny access. (This system is described above in the critical operations employees health section).
* For deliveries of equipment a secure conduit for receiving goods to the control center should be established and under strict control to limit unnecessary access by external delivery personnel to the facility. 
* Visits by external parties and tours of the control center should be suspended indefinitely. 
* Exceptions to the rules on access-controlled approval by VP or above in the company, in coordination with the incident command team. 
''[Ref: EPRI Interviews]''

===Travel for Critical Operations Employees===
* Business travel by critical operations employees should be completely eliminated and personal travel to restricted areas with high-risk factors should be discouraged. If travel is necessary, the employee's return to work should be assessed and monitored by the company/organisation, in some form. 
* If travel is unavoidable and quarantine is required, this should be adhered to and monitored, as per public health or government guidelines. 
''[Ref: ESCC, EPRI Interviews]'' 

===Critical Operations Employees Engagement===
* It is recommended to work with staff representatives or unions directly to develop consensus on the most appropriate approach and agree on compensation, attendance, leave, and temporary changes to policies and conditions to ensure transparency and clear communication.
* If possible this should be discussed and agreed upon in the pre-pandemic planning phase, rather than during a pandemic. 
''[Ref: ESCC]'' 

===Safety Briefings and Messaging===
* Operations management, in coordination with the incident management team, should conduct regular safety briefings with operators and critical operations employees, updating them on the latest advice and information related to the pandemic and the company/organization's specific response to it. 
* An online portal of the latest health and safety information, including information from the briefings should be accessible to all critical operations employees, both internal and external to the facilities, if possible (for access outside of work). This can take the form of FAQ or continually updated webpage or document with changes highlighted clearly. It should be searchable, to allow quick access to information.  
''[Ref: ESCC, EPRI]'' 

===Workstations / Consoles and Physical Distancing===
* Where possible, develop the greatest possible physical distancing between operator workstations/consoles. 
* Identify additional workspaces or rooms (for transmission, this must be within the CIP perimeter) where operations work can be performed securely, but giving a large physical distance between each operator. 
* Where possible, critical operations employees should be assigned dedicated workstations/consoles, in order to limit unnecessary interactions and reduces the likelihood that more than the minimum number of employees will come into contact with a contaminated surface. 
''[Ref: ESCC, EPRI]'' 

===Control Center Equipment===
* Eliminate or limit common touch items, which can be vectors of infectious disease such as paper or stationary. Aim for a paper-free environment, where possible.
* Critical operations employees should be issued with individually assigned peripheral devices, to limit sharing of common touch equipment. Examples can include; a keyboard, mouse, phone headset, stationary. 
* Individually assigned items and their connection ports should be cleaned before and after every shift, simultaneously with the desk/workstation console. 
* If the individually assigned items are stored in a locker on-site, or if kept at home; they should be secured and should be cleaned regularly.
* These individual peripheral devices need to be charged or have a supply of batteries available, to limit risk of interruption during critical operations. 
''[Ref: ESCC, EPRI]'' 

===Cleaning of Facilities===
* Regular cleaning schedules, frequency, and intensity should be increased during the pandemic for the control center(s). 
* Common touch surfaces should be cleaned a number of times per day. 
* Depending on the severity and nature of the threat - medical-grade cleaning before every shift can be carried out and some utilities carried out fogging once per week in control center facilities.
* Workstations and consoles should be cleaned by operators before they begin their shift and after they complete their shift, simultaneously with cleaning their individually assigned peripheral items. 
* Porous (soft) surfaces near workstations should be cleaned regularly and, in particular, after an infectious outbreak.
* Non-porous (hard) surfaces should be cleaned with EPA-approved disinfectant products as per enhanced cleaning protocols.
* Restroom and bathroom facilities should be regularly cleaned, in particular, after an infectious outbreak. 
* Common touch items should be disposed of, which can be vectors of disease such as paper or stationary. Dispose of all such items after an infectious outbreak. 
''[Ref: ESCC, EPRI]'' 

=== Hygiene (to be Cross-Referenced with WS1) === 
Critical Operations employees should be encouraged to proactively and regularly apply personal hygiene techniques to limit the spread of infection, inside and outside of work. These measures include:
* Routine handwashing with soap and hot water for at least 20 seconds.
* Use of an alcohol hand sanitizer (60 % + alcohol content).
* Washing facilities and hand sanitizers should be made available in multiple locations within the control center and around the facility. 
* Sharing of food and buffets among operators should be prohibited
'''* For more details, please refer to EPRI Pandemic Resilient System Supplemental Project WS1.''' 
''[Ref: ESCC, EPRI]'' 

=== Remote Work === 
* For BES (>100 kV) in North America operations are strictly limited to within the CIP perimeter. 
* For distribution system operations, some remote access for access to the outage management system and monitoring and control may be required if access is limited to the control centers. 
* Operators on off-shift days or relief or training can work remotely with access to corporate applications and read-only system monitoring via VPN. This limits unnecessary access to the control center facility for critical operations employees not working on shift.
* IT equipment and ease of access to IT systems remotely via VPN should be made available for all critical operations employees that require it, in particular, operators who are working remotely on relief or training days.
''[Ref: EPRI]''

==Building Facilities and Layout During a Pandemic== 
=== Additional Control Centers and Workspaces === 
* The company/organization should leverage additional space for real-time control center operations within the security perimeter of the control center where this is achievable. This can be in a separate room, or a training simulator environment if these are available on site. 
* Alternatively, backup control center facilities should be used to distribute risk and operations, where this is possible. 
* The additional spaces can be used for both real-time operations functions, and for operations, planning, engineering, or support functions, where necessary. 
''[Ref: ESCC, EPRI Interviews]'' 

===Bathroom Facilities===
* Limit the number of people entering bathroom facilities simultaneously to avoid cross-contamination, exercise a one-in-one-out rule.
* Ensure physical distancing in the facilities by cordoning off certain areas that may not be required. This should serve to increases the efficiency of cleaning facilities also. 
''[Ref: ESCC, EPRI Interviews]'' 

=== Building Foot Traffic ===
* Redesign the building foot-fall and foot traffic management systems to minimize cross-overs on common congregation areas.
* Use one-way walking systems and designate specific entrance and exit doors around the facility. 
''[Ref: ESCC, EPRI Interviews]'' 

=== Kitchen Facilities ===
* If the kitchen is too small to accommodate multiple people, rotate people in and out on a rota, or use one-in-one-out rules. 
* Congregation in kitchen facilities should be limited or prohibited, 
* If possible, request to use the facilities as efficiently as possible and for critical operations employees to eat at desks.
* Sharing of kitchen equipment should be eliminated, and single-use utensils should be used or, critical operations employees should bring their own kitchen utensils or equipment. 
''[Ref: ESCC, EPRI Interviews]'' 

===Lodging Facilities===
In the event the pandemic reaches a state that sequestration of employees on-site or in specially designated sites (hotel, mobile RV accommodation) is likely to be required. 
* On-site lodging can consist of 
**Existing restroom or lodging facilities for storm or blackout operations postures are utilized or repurposed.
**Repurposing of existing office spaces to be suitable for lodging
**RV or mobile lodging facilities on the site of the control center
**Nearby hotel, ideally commandeering entire floors or wings of hotels to keep critical operations employees segregated. 
* For more information on sequestration, see the section below. 
''[Ref: ESCC, EPRI]''

=== Ventilation and Air Conditioning ===
* The measures in control rooms for pandemic resilience will take a multi-faceted engineering approach, which may include measures in the categories of Ventilation, filtration, HVAC control improvements, Purification, Relative humidity control, Occupancy control, Energy/heat recovery, and Retro-Commissioning. 
* Some of these have specific requirements made by the ASHRAE (e.g., MERV 13 and above filters) and some are more specific to the building’s HVAC system (e.g., heat recovery/energy wheels) or the specific climate. So the ventilation and air condition measures are a combination of industry-wide guidelines and specific needs of the particular building. 
* For more information, please see project deliverables from WS1 - Health and Disinfection Methods and Technologies, and the "Pandemic Best Practices: Ventilation and Engineering Controls" when its released in 2021. 
''[Ref: EPRI]''

== Control Center and Crew Segregation Primary and Backup Operations ==
Much of the decision-making on using primary and backup control centers is multi-factorial and dependent on the company/organization, location of facilities, and the incidence of the pandemic in the community in the vicinity of the control center. For example, the decision to sequester may depend on the availability of lodging in the control center facilities or the location of external lodging facilities.  
Some of the key practices, utilized by companies/organizations are documented below. 

===Shift Crew Segregation===
* It is recommended to segregate each crew into two or more sub-crews who work opposite and do not intermingle. 
* The make-up of the sub crews should be a good mix of experienced and less experienced people, who live in different areas. This is so that if travel in a specific area is restricted because of community spread, it does not overly impact the entire sub crew. 
* The number of critical operations employees on a shift should be reduced to the minimum possible in line with the pre-pandemic planning and capacity building assessment of minimum viable critical functions and processes. Critical operations employees not required can be kept in reserve or added to another rotation.
* If possible, a complete healthy crew should be held in reserve (and possibly sequestered, depending on the severity of the pandemic) for extreme scenarios, such as when staffing levels reach a minimum viable level.
* If necessary or possible; establish (or enhance existing) mutual assistance agreements with neighboring companies/organizations for the exchange of critical operations employees. 
''[Ref: ESCC, EPRI Interviews]'' 

=== Distribute Operations - Switching Regularly (Daily or Weekly) ===
Some companies/organizations chose a strategy of distributed operations, which required them to switch operations between sites regularly. Sub crews are assigned a location, depending on where they live. This had advantages and disadvantages as listed below. 
'''Advantages'''
* No intermingling between sub-crews.
* Regular cleaning of both facilities.
* Regular test of backup facility and systems, including finding and addressing latent issues.
* Ability to seamlessly switch between two centers in case of an infectious outbreak. 
'''Disadvantages'''
* Backup has typically fewer features, scale, and comfort levels for operators. 
* Backup facilities may not be optimal for extended operation.
* There may be locational difficulties such as: Backup may not be located advantageously for operators to travel to and from to or backup may be located in a downtown area.
* Some sub-crews are in the less comfortable site for long periods, leading to dissatisfaction.

'''Practices'''
* There should be a "Pandemic Manager" on all shifts with responsibility for oversight of the implementation of pandemic mitigation practices.
* Two separate crews assigned to two separate facilities (main and backup) with no cross-over between crews. 
* Both sites can be left on hot standby.
* Turnover can be daily, weekly or longer depending on shift schedules.

=== Isolate Facilities === 
Some companies/organizations chose to utilize a strategy of completely isolating one facility, keeping it as a hot contingency site, while working safely out of the main facility. 
'''Advantages'''
* Sterile backup site with no access unless required following an infectious outbreak.
* Keep operators in a familiar environment and location. 
* If the backup facility is a disadvantageous location (such as downtown in a city) this strategy limits exposure of operators to public.
'''Disadvantages''' 
* Crews still intermingle during shift turnovers. 
* reduced ability to clean and sterilize the main site due to operations being continually on. 
* Maybe latent issues with facilities and systems that may take time to troubleshoot. 

'''Practices'''
* There should be a "Pandemic Manager" on all shifts with responsibility for oversight of the implementation of pandemic mitigation practices.
* Trigger point for moving to clean backup is usually an infected operator within an operations crew.
* This triggers the moving to the backup site and full cleaning and sterilization of the main site. 

=== Sequestration of Control Centre Personnel ===
Sequestration is likely to be the most effective means of controlling the risk to critical operations employees during a pandemic. However, it will also likely be one of the most cost and resource-intensive options to deploy. It can also place an additional burden on employees and their families during an already stressful period. 
Sequestration is not an option preferred by all companies/organizations and is often the most extreme measure for pandemic risk mitigation. However, it is always on business continuity and pandemic mitigation plans due to the risk of a completely uncontrolled endemic 
'''Advantages'''
* Isolates operators, very reduced risk of infection or outbreak amongst sequestered critical operations employees.
* Span of monitoring and cleaning limited to one site.
* No intermingling between shift crew and any other external people
* Full control over critical operations employees' activities. 

'''Disadvantages''' 
* Mental health aspects of confinement
* Not all critical operations employees will be willing or able to commit to sequestration, even with enhanced benefits.
* Resource intensive, investment in remuneration, facility upgrades for lodging and food.
* Need to sequester medical staff, cooking staff, and cleaning staff. 
* requires robust IT infrastructure and communications for maintenance of contact with the outside world. 
* Can be difficult to find the trigger point to unwind, once started. 

'''Practices'''
* '''Pandemic Manager''' - There should be a "Pandemic Manager" on all shifts with responsibility for oversight of the implementation of pandemic mitigation practices.
* '''Develop a list of volunteer operators''' willing to be sequestered. This may require enhanced remuneration, in negotiation with union representatives (in the pre-pandemic planning stage)
* '''Shift schedules''' – Shift schedules for sequestered critical operations employees in some cases have been kept the same as the normal schedules, usually three turnovers in a day, while others have moved to 12-hour shifts to reduce human interactions. At least two crews were sequestered during the sequestration cycle, to allow an on/ off shift schedule. Some extra employees should be included in the event of a contingency or if some employees within the sequestered crew get ill or need to leave for an emergency. 
* '''Sequestration Duration''' – Companies/organizations have established 14, 19, 30, 42-day sequestration periods or waves, and typically require the next round of sequestered critical operations employees to self-isolate at home. The minimum should be 14 days, considering the illness symptom and quarantine duration time. 
* '''Backup Shift Crew''' - It may be possible to sequester one control center while practicing standard pandemic mitigation measures at another backup control center. This measure ensures continued operational reliability, while having a sequestered and secure shift crew, in case of an outbreak at the backup facility. 
* '''Trigger points''' for entering and exiting sequestration should be established and clearly communicated.
* '''Lodging for sequestered operation''' – Companies/organizations have implemented three approaches to lodging—sequestering in either trailers/RVs on site, repurposed office spaces in the control centers or in hotel rooms or entire wings of hotels. In the latter scenario, utilities usually conduct cleaning responsibilities themselves directly for the hotel and transport operators to and from the control center. The latter scenario also exposes operators to risks of community interaction and is not considered a fully secured sequestration. 
* '''Food and Cooking''' - It is important to maintain a supply of fresh, nutritious, and appetizing meals. With an emphasis on maintaining safety, food preparation practices can include sequestering chefs with operators, operators preparing their own food, or delivering food from suppliers and restaurants. Communal dining facilities should be limited during the sequestration period. 
* '''Medical Services''''' - There should be ongoing monitoring of the health of sequestered critical operations employees, including regular testing for illnesses, temperature monitoring, open and transparent symptom reporting, mental health, and well-being checks. If possible, a dedicated medical practitioner can be sequestered with the shift crew to provide this support. Follow-up medical services should be made available for all sequestered shift staff when they come off their cycles. It is recommended to provide a dedicated medical phone line for all employees to report issues and ask questions with medical practitioners, which can relieve pressure from supervisors and provide standardized answers for medical issues. 
* '''Mental Health Aspects''' – Sequestration away from family and friends for extended periods is a challenge and a great sacrifice made by many operators. Utilities have helped maintain regular video communications to family and friends on the outside world. Continued and regular discussions with employees and physical and mental health checks are key, along with access to employee assistance programs. Focus is maintained through continued discussions among the team and supervisors, before and during shifts.
* '''Cleaning and Sanitation Services''' - Even in sequestered facilities the highest standards of cleaning and sanitation should be maintained, with regular high-quality cleaning of common areas, control center facilities and food preparation areas essential. Cleaning staff, as with cooking staff and medical practitioners may be sequestered with the critical operations employees, where this is possible. HEPA air filters and air handling units can be provided if availble. 
* '''Logistics''' – There are also many logistical considerations that vary based on the sequestration approach, such as providing laundry, shower, and exercise facilities. The delivery of parcels and mail to sequestered operators is controlled and packages are cleaned before delivery.
* '''Physical Exercise and Entertainment''' – An important aspect of sequestration, utilities have made walking tracks and fields available and some have installed gyms in sequestered sites. Entertainment rooms for games, TV, and movies have also been installed. 
* '''Family Support''' - Connectivity between the sequestered employees and their families is essential to maintain mental health and well-being and to provide support during the sequestration period. The needs of the family; such as child-care, medical transportation should be considered in consultation with the company/organization. In some instances in the 2020-2021 pandemic non-critical operations employees, in companies that sequestered employees, established contact and support for the families of sequestered critical operations employees. 
 
''[Ref: ESCC, EPRI, EPRI Interviews]'' 

==Guidelines for Changing Posture for Control Center Operations==
Utilities that have not sequestered their employees are formulating and documenting criteria that might require sequestering and are communicating those criteria to critical operations employees. In addition to these quantitative measures, more qualitative criteria related to the infection rates in the geographic regions or state/federal mandates are considered before changing levels. The decision to sequester staff in company/organization facilities should not be based on one data point and should be part of a more holistic risk assessment.

[[File:Sequestration table decision protocols.png|thumb|center|Sequestration table decision ]]
* It is recommended to consider a graduated, level-based approach based on thresholds of infection within the company/organization or the wider community, city, region, state, or country. An example of this is shown in the image above. Each level of the pandemic response plan has various mitigation measures associated, such as social distancing hand washing at PR1, mask and PPE at PR 2 etc. 
* Keeping a graduated response level and thresholds allows for the efficient and safe unwinding of sequestration measures if the risk in the community reduces from the most severe levels (which originally triggered sequestration). Without a graduated level-based approach, it may be difficult to decide when it is safe to return to normal posture. 
* The indicators for community spread of the pandemic illnesses are dependent on community testing, which is dependent on local government or state responses and resources. For the pandemic of 2020-2021, this was slow to take hold, but for any future pandemics, it is expected that these indicators will be established quickly and in the public domain for decision-makers. 
* The thresholds for community spread should, if possible, reflect the risk of critical operations employees coming into contact with an infected person in the community, even if they are sheltered in place. This can be difficult to measure and monitor as it will vary depending on local and national government controls on society as a whole.  
* Absentee levels among company organization critical operations employees and employees more generally can be monitored as part of self-reporting and should be tracked via easy to understand dashboards. 
* Prior to making the decision to sequester critical operations employees, the minimum viable staffing requirements should be established and the levels of pandemic-related illness as a percentage of the minimum critical staff threshold can be established and monitored. As an illustrative example, one utility used an illness threshold of one-third of all available critical operations employees, before sequestration would be implemented. Another company let a level of minimum viable staffing levels plus 50 %. 
* Availability of testing is an important consideration also. For sequestration to be maximally effective - regular testing of the sequestered employees should be carried out, especially at the beginning of their cycles. If testing is unavailable and/or community spread has reached such a level that the risk to all operators of infection is impossible to mitigate, then sequestration may not be effective or necessary. 
* At some point in a pandemic, mandates for shelter-in-place or sequestration of critical operations employees may be issued by local or state-level governments. Regular contact should be maintained between the company organization and local/state/national government decision-makers, via the external operations team. 
* At some point in a pandemic, mandates for shelter-in-place or sequestration of critical operations employees may be issued by BES reliability coordinators. Regular contact should be maintained between the company/organization and BES reliability decision-makers such as the RC, NERC, ENTSO-E in Europe, or other such organizations. 

''[Ref: ESCC, EPRI Interviews]'' 

=== Return to Normal Operations === 
Some of the triggers used by the comapnies/organizations that sequestered considered as part of their risk assessment methodlogy were as follows: 
* Within state or country - infection rate below a pre-established threshold 
* Within state or country - vaccinations available for everybody
For returning to normal operations some considerations were: 
* Maintain some health screening, testing, self-reporting of health status via survey for critical operations employees. 
* Begin with critical operations people and critical IT staff to return to work as normal. Following successful completion of this phase, begin phase for return of groups of staff, depending on criticality.
''[Ref: ESCC, EPRI Interviews]'' 

==Other Topics and Guidelines for Considertaion== 
=== Training of Critical Operations Employees===

* Switch to a hybrid model of training. Do offline computer-based training exercises remotely, only attend the facility to utilize the simulator
* Focus on training on processes for switching command and control between main and backup facilities, especially for troubleshooting issues. 
* Focus on control centers providing backup/emergency support for other control centers in the same company (but different footprint) for short 
to medium periods in the event of an outbreak among critical operations employees. 
''[Ref: ESCC, EPRI Interviews]''

=== Vaccination === 
* Vaccination mandates for critical operations employees are company/organisation dependent

== References == 

=== EPRI tech Brief Report 2020 ===
Powering Through Together: Identifying COVID-19 Transmission and Distribution Operations Practices
[https://www.epri.com/research/products/000000003002019435 Download Report]

=== ESCC ===

The electricity subsector council (ESCC) release a series of documents and practices for operation in pandemic conditions. 
Resource guide last updated July 7th 2021

[https://www.electricitysubsector.org/-/media/Files/ESCC/Documents/ESCC_COVID_Resource_Guide_v2-03242020.ashx?la=en&hash=D3732CBFB46827AA0331277E8D5CBE0CC4DFC3BF ESCC Assessing and Mitigating the Novel Coronavirus (COVID-19) A RESOURCE GUIDE]